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THESES
•	 One	of	the	main	effects	of	the	economic	crisis	in	Ukraine	provoked	by	Rus-
sian	aggression	was	the	collapse	of	foreign	trade.	Between	2013	and	2017,	
Ukrainian	exports	fell	by	31%,	and	imports	by	35%.	Serious	changes	were	
seen	 in	both	 the	geographical	and	goods	structure	of	Ukrainian	trade	 in	
the	same	period.	The	European	Union	for	the	first	time	in	history	became	
Ukraine’s	main	trade	partner,	and	the	post-Soviet	countries	lost	their	pre-
vious	significance.	Regardless	of	the	improvement	in	the	economic	situa-
tion	seen	since	2016,	Ukraine	is	still	far	from	overcoming	the	consequences	
of	this	collapse.	
•	 Until	2013,	Ukrainian	exports	were	based	to	a	great	extent	on	the	sale	of	
mineral	raw	materials	(mainly	iron	ore)	and	low-processed	goods	(main-
ly	 products	 of	 the	 metallurgical	 industry)	 originating	 from	 companies	
controlled	 by	 representatives	 of	 big	 business,	 and	 agricultural	 products	
(around	60%	of	total	exports).	At	a	time	when	the	prices	on	global	markets	
were	high,	exports	were	highly	profitable	but	also	extremely	sensitive	to	
economic	fluctuations.	At	present,	Ukraine	relies	on	exports	of	raw	materi-
als	and	low-processed	products	even	more	(an	increase	to	70%)	than	before	
the	crisis;	the	only	difference	is	that	products	of	the	agricultural	and	food	
sector	(above	all	grain	and	vegetable	oils)	currently	predominate	in	the	ex-
port	structure	instead	of	metallurgical	products.	
•	 Until	2013,	the	Ukrainian	foreign	trade	in	goods	was	strongly	diversified	
in	geographical	terms.	Trade	was	more	or	less	equally	divided	into	three	
areas:	Russia	and	other	post-Soviet	countries,	the	European	Union,	and	the	
other	countries.	However,	the	diversity	was	very	limited	as	regards	goods	
structure.	Dependent	on	the	geographical	region,	different	goods	were	ex-
ported	and	imported,	which	meant	that	a	simple	replacement	of	one	mar-
ket	with	another	was	very	difficult	and	often	impossible.	
•	 The	 Kremlin’s	 aggressive	 moves	 led	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 greater	 part	 of	
Ukraine’s	 market	 share	 not	 only	 in	 Russia	 but	 also	 in	 the	 remaining	
post-Soviet	countries	(in	particular,	Kazakhstan)	and	contributed	to	the	
collapse	of	the	sale	of	the	machine	industry’s	products,	the	only	item	in	
Ukrainian	exports	with	a	high	added	value.	Given	the	fact	that	Ukrain-
ian-Russian	relations	are	unlikely	 to	 improve	 in	 the	medium	term,	 the	
changes	that	have	taken	place	in	the	geographical	and	goods	structures	
of	Ukrainian	trade	are	durable.	
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•	 The	Deep	 and	Comprehensive	 Free	Trade	Area	 (DCFTA)	 agreement	with	
the	EU,	binding	since	the	beginning	of	2016,	has	proven	to	be	an	effective	
tool	 enabling	 the	 Ukrainian	 economy	 to	 overcome	 the	 crisis	 and	 soften	
the	 consequences	of	 the	 collapse	of	 trade	 resulting	 from	 the	Russian	ag-
gression.	Owing	to	the	DCFTA,	the	value	of	Ukrainian	exports	to	the	EU	
in	2017	exceeded	the	level	reached	in	2013.	However,	some	representatives	
of	the	Ukrainian	government	had	expectations	that	the	EU	market	would	
quickly	compensate	for	the	lost	post-Soviet	markets,	and	this	has	proven	to	
be	unrealistic,	especially	as	regards	 industrial	production.	However,	 the	
potential	of	the	DCFTA	has	not	been	used	to	its	full	extent,	and	to	be	able	
to	capitalise	fully	on	the	opportunities	offered	by	the	agreement,	Ukraine	
should	 implement	 the	EU	norms	and	standards	at	a	 faster	rate.	Kyiv	has	
recently	 increasingly	been	delaying	the	 fulfilment	of	 its	undertakings	 to	
this	effect.	As	a	result,	 the	opportunities	of	accessing	the	EU	market	has	
not	been	fully	used.	
•	 The	reduction	of	trade	with	non-EU	countries	and	the	post-Soviet	area	(the	
so-called	‘rest	of	the	world’)	after	2013	has	been	an	effect	above	all	of	the	
economic	 problems	 in	Ukraine	 itself	 resulting	 from	 the	Russian	 aggres-
sion,	including	the	extremely	strict	restrictions	on	the	currency	market,	
which	seriously	impeded	effecting	transactions	with	foreign	entities.	Even	
though	Ukraine	increased	the	exports	of	food	and	agricultural	products	to	
these	countries	in	2013–2017,	it	was	unsuccessful	not	only	in	finding	new	
outlets	as	an	alternative	to	the	post-Soviet	markets,	but	also	in	maintaining	
the	previous	sale	volume,	especially	as	regards	exports	of	the	production	of	
the	machine	and	chemical	industries.	
•	 Service	trade	is	essential	for	Ukraine	because	of	the	regular	positive	bal-
ance	that	ensures	a	constant	influx	of	foreign	currency.	Transport	servic-
es	account	for	more	than	a	half	of	the	exports	value	in	this	area.	Income	
generated	by	some	kinds	of	transport	(for	example,	railway	and	maritime	
transport)	has	shrunk	dramatically	due	to	the	conflict	with	Russia.	How-
ever,	the	most	important	service	–	the	transit	of	Russian	gas	via	Ukrainian	
territory	–	has	remained	at	a	level	existing	before	the	crisis.	Given	the	fact	
that	it	ensures	almost	one	third	of	the	income	generated	by	service	exports,	
the	significant	reduction	of	gas	transit	planned	by	Russia	after	the	launch	
of	the	Nord	Stream	2	gas	pipeline	will	be	very	painful	to	Kyiv.
•	 Since	the	mid-2000s,	the	Ukrainian	trade	in	goods	has	been	characterised	
by	a	regular	negative	balance,	which	could	only	partly	be	compensated	by	
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the	surplus	generated	by	 the	 trade	 in	 services.	This	phenomenon	caused	
a	drainage	of	the	country’s	foreign	currency	reserves	and	was	one	of	the	
major	components	of	the	crises	in	2009	and	2014–2015,	leading	to	the	de-
preciation	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 currency.	 The	 collapse	 of	 imports	 resulted	
in	a	positive	 trade	balance	 in	2015.	However,	 in	2017,	Ukraine	again	had	
a	trade	deficit.	If	this	trend	intensifies,	this	will	mean	a	serious	challenge	
to	the	country’s	balance	of	payments,	especially	considering	the	fact	that	
Ukraine’s	economic	stabilisation	is	still	fragile.	
•	 Without	thorough	economic	reforms	and,	above	all,	the	creation	of	condi-
tions	for	the	influx	of	foreign	investments	that	would	lead	to	the	economy	
being	modernised,	Ukraine	will	have	no	choice	other	than	to	continue	the	
present	model	of	exports	based	on	the	sale	of	raw	materials	and	products	
with	a	low	added	value,	and	this	is	highly	sensitive	to	global	economic	fluc-
tuations	and,	in	the	case	of	agriculture,	weather	conditions.	The	policy	of	
the	government	in	Kyiv	after	2014,	regardless	of	some	successes,	especial-
ly	in	the	area	of	deregulation,	has	not	led	to	a	radical	improvement	of	the	
business	climate,	and	there	are	no	grounds	to	expect	any	improvement	in	
this	area	in	the	short	run.	
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InTroducTIon
The	multi-vector	policy,	i.e.	manoeuvring	between	the	West	and	Russia	without	
becoming	involved	in	integration	projects	with	either	of	them,	which	Ukraine	
had	been	following	since	it	regained	independence	also	had	an	economic	aspect.	
Trade	with	Russia	and	other	post-Soviet	countries,	the	European	Union	and	the	
rest	of	the	world	was	equally	important	for	Kyiv	albeit	for	different	reasons.	
Ukraine’s	unwillingness	to	make	binding	decisions	whether	to	establish	closer	
co-operation	with	Russia	or	the	EU	was	to	a	great	extent	an	effect	of	its	concern	
about	the	negative	impact	of	this	move	on	economic	relations	with	the	remain-
ing	areas.	Ukrainian	oligarchs,	the	main	beneficiaries	of	income	from	exports,	
also	failed	to	take	a	joint	stance	of	integration	processes	in	the	region	and	were	
satisfied	with	the	state	of	suspension	in	which	Ukraine	had	found	itself.	
Over	time,	this	manoeuvring	became	increasingly	difficult.	On	the	one	hand,	
Moscow	was	applying	increasing	pressure	on	Ukraine	to	join	the	Customs	Union	
which	was	replaced	by	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	while	on	the	other	hand,	
Brussels	came	up	with	the	proposal	of	signing	an	Association	Agreement	with	
Kyiv,	part	of	which	was	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	
agreement	envisaging	not	only	the	removal	of	most	customs	barriers	but	also	
the	deep	harmonisation	of	Ukrainian	law	with	the	EU’s	acquis.	President	Vik-
tor	Yanukovych’s	decision	not	to	sign	the	Association	Agreement	was	the	main	
cause	of	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	which	led	to	the	toppling	of	the	government	
in	Kyiv.	In	response	to	this,	Russia	launched	its	military	aggression	in	Ukraine.	
The	conflict	with	Moscow	was	not	only	an	immense	shock	to	the	Ukrainian	
political	elite	and	public	–	it	also	turned	out	to	be	a	kind	of	a	shock	therapy	
for	the	Ukrainian	economy,	including	its	energy	and	financial	sectors.	After	
2014,	very	serious	and	deep	changes	were	seen	in	Ukraine’s	foreign	co-operation	
resulting	from	two	factors:	the	Russian	aggression	and	the	effects	the	DCFTA	
with	the	EU	began	to	bring.
This	paper	is	aimed	at	showing	the	changes	that	took	place	in	Ukraine’s	trade	
between	2013	and	2017,	i.e.	from	the	last	year	before	the	Russian	aggression	
to	when	the	DCFTA	began	to	apply	fully.	The	text	is	focused	mainly	on	describ-
ing	the	trade	in	goods,	since	it	has	the	greatest	impact	on	Ukraine,	but	it	also	
outlines	the	trade	in	services	and	the	main	problems	concerning	the	balance	
of	trade.	This	report	analyses	both	the	geographical	structure	of	Ukraine’s	for-
eign	trade	and	goods	structure,	which	helps	analyse	the	benefits	and	the	losses	
that	the	changes	seen	over	the	past	five	years	brought	Kyiv.	
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Unless	otherwise	stated,	all	the	figures	provided	in	this	text	originate	from	
the	website	of	the	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine	(SSCU,	http://www.
ukrstat.gov.ua/)	or	are	the	author’s	own	calculations	based	on	statistical	data	
from	the	SSCU.	The	data	for	2013–2017	have	been	corrected	and	do	not	cover	the	
territories	of	the	Autonomous	Republic	of	Crimea	and	the	parts	of	Donetsk	and	
Luhansk	Oblasts	which	are	not	currently	controlled	by	the	government	in	Kyiv.	
Thus	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	military	operation	in	Donbass	have	not	
had	a	direct	effect	on	the	changes	in	the	trade	volume	described	further	in	this	
text,	even	though	their	indirect	impact	(economic	crisis	in	Ukraine,	disruption	
of	production	chains,	destruction	of	infrastructure)	is	significant1.
1	 The	 real	 size	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	Russian	 aggression	 in	Ukraine	 is	 extremely	 dif-
ficult	 to	determine	 in	precise	figures.	An	attempt	was	made	by	Anders	Åslund,	who	esti-
mates	in	his	report	that	Ukraine	lost	assets	worth	nearly	US$100	billion	as	a	result	of	the	
annexation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 the	war	 in	 Donbass.	 A.	 Åslund,	Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine,	
Atlantic	Council,	March	2018,	http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Krem-
lin_Aggression_web_040218_revised.pdf
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I. cHaracTErISTIcS of THE ukraInIan goodS TradE 
unTIl 2013
After	a	period	of	recession	which	continued	through	the	1990s,	starting	from	
2000,	Ukraine	entered	a	period	of	intensive	economic	development	combined	
with	very	 fast	 trade	growth.	 In	2001–2008,	 the	value	of	 exports	 increased	
more	than	fourfold	(from	US$16.2	billion	to	US$67	billion).	Imports	grew	even	
faster	–	by	almost	550%	(from	US$15.8	billion	to	US$85.5	billion).	The	Ukrainian	
economy	quickly	became	dependent	on	exports	of	raw	materials	(mainly	metal	
ores	and	low-processed	goods,	above	all	products	of	the	metallurgical	industry).	
Given	the	oligarchic	system	and	political	instability	existing	in	Ukraine,	the	
export	of	such	products	was	the	simplest	and	the	fastest	way	for	representatives	
of	big	business	to	guarantee	themselves	profits.	Exports	were	based	to	a	great	
extent	on	privatised	post-Soviet	industrial	assets	and	did	not	require	any	major	
investments,	and	at	the	same	time	were	highly	profitable,	given	the	high	prices	
of	iron	ore	and	cast	iron	and	steel	products.	The	fortunes	of	most	Ukrainian	
oligarchs,	such	as	Rinat	Akhmetov,	Viktor	Pinchuk,	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi,	Vadym	
Novinskyi	or	Kostyantyn	Zhevago	were	built	precisely	on	exports	of	metal-
lurgical	products.	
This	model	of	exports	was	very	profitable	during	the	global	economic	boom	
but	turned	out	to	be	quite	unstable	and	susceptible	to	external	shocks	which	
caused	very	strong	fluctuations	in	trade	dynamics.	It	can	be	concluded	that	the	
condition	of	the	Ukrainian	economy	depended	on	steel	prices	to	a	similar	extent	
as	that	of	the	Russian	economy	on	oil	and	gas	prices.	Ukraine	painfully	real-
ised	the	threats	that	such	excessive	dependence	on	the	demand	for	raw	mate-
rials	on	foreign	markets	pose	during	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2007–2008	
which	led	to	a	breakdown	of	the	Ukrainian	economy	in	2009	(Ukraine’s	GDP	
fell	by	15.1%	in	this	period),	caused	to	a	great	extent	by	a	heavy	drop	in	exports	
(in	2009	exports	fell	by	41%).	It	is	not	so	much	the	very	fact	that	the	falls	took	
place	which	is	surprising,	but	their	scale.	However,	the	shock	that	came	at	that	
time	did	not	last	long	–	Ukrainian	exports	went	up	29%	in	2010	to	exceed	the	
level	achieved	in	2008	already	in	2011.	
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regional division
In this paper, the countries across the globe have been divided into three 
regions:
•	 28 EU member states; 
•	 post-Soviet countries – members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States;
•	 other countries. 
This division was used mainly because it is also used by the State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine on whose data this paper is based. Alternative vari-
ants, for example, analysing the member states of the Eurasian Economic 
Union instead of the CIS or the European Economic Area or the EU’s Cus-
toms Union instead of the EU-28 would provide very similar results as the 
division applied in this paper. 
Until	2013,	Ukrainian	foreign	trade	was	well	diversified	in	terms	of	geographi-
cal	structure.	The	key	regions	of	trade	were:	the	post-Soviet	countries,	the	
European	Union	(EU-28)	and	other	countries,	the	most	important	of	which	
were	Middle	Eastern	countries,	China	and	India.	Each	of	these	three	areas	
accounted	for	around	one	third	of	Ukrainian	trade	volume.	Ukraine	regularly	
generated	a	negative	trade	balance	which	in	2013	reached	-US$10.2	billion	
in	the	case	of	the	EU	and	-US$5.9	billion	in	the	case	of	post-Soviet	countries.	
The	deficit	was	only	partly	compensated	by	the	surplus	in	trade	with	other	
countries	(+US$2.5	billion).	
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ukraine as compared to other countries in the region
Given	the	significance	of	 the	trade	 in	goods	for	Kyiv	as	described	above,	
it	 is	worth	comparing	the	results	of	 trade	generated	by	Ukraine	and	the	
neighbouring	countries.	Ukraine,	after	Moldova,	is	Europe’s	second	poorest	
country.	However,	the	scale	of	the	differences	in	trade	may	be	surprising.
Chart  1. Comparison of trade of Central and Eastern European countries 
(in billions EUR)
ImportsExports
2013 2014 2015 2016 20172013 2014 2015 2016 2017
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Romania
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Poland
Ukraine Slovakia
RomaniaHungary
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Source:	Eurostat,	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine,	National	Statistical	Committee	of	the	Repu-
blic	of	Belarus,	National	Statistical	Office	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova2
Among	 the	 neighbouring	 countries,	 Ukraine	 has	 a	 population	 similar	
to	that	of	Poland.	However,	both	Ukrainian	exports	and	imports	are	five	
times	smaller	than	Poland’s.	Ukraine’s	trade	is	half	that	of	Slovakia	which	
has	a	population	of	 just	5.5	million.	When	compared	with	Romania,	one	
of	the	 least	wealthy	EU	member	states,	 the	situation	is	similar.	The	only	
two	neighbouring	countries	to	have	smaller	trade	than	Ukraine	are	Belarus	
(it	is	worth	bearing	in	mind	that	this	country’s	population	is	more	than	four	
times	smaller)	and	Moldova.	The	scale	of	Ukraine’s	backwardness	as	com-
pared	to	the	remaining	countries	in	the	region	is	even	more	evident,	if	one	
compares	per capita incomes	in	trade.	
2	 Data	from	Ukraine	and	Belarus	have	been	calculated	according	to	the	US$/EUR	exchange	
rate	0.85	of	11	June	2018;	Bloomberg,	https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDEUR:CUR
13
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Chart 2. Comparison of per capita income in trade (in thousands EUR) 
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Source:	Eurostat,	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine,	National	Statistical	Committee	of	the	Repu-
blic	of	Belarus,	National	Statistical	Office	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova	and	Wikipedia
Chart 3. Geographical structure of Ukraine’s exports and imports in 2013 
Exports 2013 Imports 2013
Rest of the world
39%
Post-Soviet countries
35%
EU 28
26%
Rest of the world
29%
Post-Soviet countries
36%
EU 28
35%
Source:	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine
When	one	 takes	 into	account	 the	goods	structure	of	 foreign	 trade,	 it	 turns	
out	that	the	diversification	of	foreign	partners	was	to	a	great	extent	illusory.	
Depending	 on	 the	 geographical	 region,	 the	 structure	 of	 both	 exports	 and	
imports	was	significantly	different.	Metallurgical	production	predominated	
(38%	in	2013)	in	exports	to	the	EU,	products	of	machine	and	electric	machine	
industries	were	predominant	in	exports	to	the	CIS,	and	food	and	agricultural	
products	were	the	main	exports	to	the	other	countries.	One	contributory	fac-
tor	to	the	increase	of	trade	deficit	was	Ukraine’s	almost	complete	dependence	
on	fuel	imports	(above	all	natural	gas	and	also	petroleum	products)	from	Rus-
sia.	 In	2013,	 the	value	of	 fuel	 imports	 from	the	Russian	Federation	reached	
US$14.5	billion,	accounting	for	62%	of	total	imports	from	this	country	and	68%	
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of	the	value	of	fuels	imported	by	Ukraine.	This	meant	that	in	the	case	of	a	crisis	
in	Ukraine’s	relations	with	any	of	the	key	trade	partners	it	would	be	an	enor-
mous	challenge	to	find	alternative	outlets	(in	the	case	of	exports)	and	sources	
of	supplies	(in	the	case	of	imports).	
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II. THE 2014–2015 crISIS and ITS conSEquEncES
While	the	crisis	in	2009	was	an	effect	of	the	economic	slump	on	global	markets,	
the	collapse	of	Ukraine’s	economy	in	2014–2015	(its	GDP	fell	15.4%)	was	caused	
above	all	by	political	factors.	Negative	trends	in	the	Ukrainian	economy	could	
already	be	observed	from	2012	but	these	were	a	result	of	the	increasingly	out-
dated	economic	model	caused	by	the	lack	of	reforms	and	corruption	which	had	
expanded	to	an	enormous	degree	under	Yanukovych’s	rule	(even	by	Ukrainian	
standards).	A	continuation	of	this	policy	would	have	led	to	stagnation	and	prob-
ably	a	small	recession.	However,	without	the	Russian	aggression,	both	military	
(the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	attempts	to	destabilise	the	south-eastern	regions	
of	Ukraine	and	the	military	operation	in	Donbass)	and	economic	(major	restric-
tions	of	access	to	the	Russian	market	and	the	trade	war	–	for	more	details,	see	
below),	Ukraine	would	not	have	experienced	its	worst	economic	crisis	since	the	
early	1990s.	
Russia’s	moves	have	led	to	extremely	deep	changes	in	the	geographical	and	goods	
structures	of	Ukrainian	trade.	These	changes	seem	to	be	durable.	As	a	result,	
the	significance	of	the	Russian	market	and	those	of	other	post-Soviet	countries	
in	Ukraine’s	 trade	has	fallen	dramatically	(for	more	details	see	the	chapter	
‘The	Russian	market	–	the	collapse	of	trade’).	
Chart 4. Russia’s share in Ukraine’s trade as compared to other post-Soviet 
countries
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One	effect	of	the	Russian	moves	was	the	fact	that	the	EU	in	2016	for	the	first	time	
in	history	became	Kyiv’s	largest	trade	partner.	
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Chart 5. Geographical structure of Ukrainian exports and imports in 2017
Exports 2017 Imports 2017
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However,	most	importantly,	the	deep	economic	crisis	provoked	by	the	military	
conflict	led	to	a	collapse	of	Ukraine’s	foreign	trade	as	a	whole.	Even	though	the	
collapse	of	trade	concerned	relations	with	Russia	and	other	post-Soviet	coun-
tries	to	the	greatest	degree,	it	was	also	visible	in	the	case	of	all	of	Ukraine’s	
other	partners.	
Chart 6. Comparison of Ukraine’s exports and imports in 2013–2017
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The	economic	collapse	in	Ukraine	reached	such	a	high	degree	due	to	several	
factors.	Until	summer	2014,	there	was	high	instability	in	most	south-eastern	
regions	of	Ukraine	provoked	by	pro-Russian	armed	gangs,	which	later	trans-
formed	into	regular	military	actions	in	Donetsk	and	Luhansk	Oblasts.	Until	
February	2015	(when	the	second	Minsk	Accord	ending	the	phase	of	large-scale	
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fighting	was	signed3),	 it	was	not	clear	whether	Ukraine	would	disintegrate	
as	a	country	or	not.	
The	external	aggression	adversely	affected	the	economy.	The	strongest	negative	
impact	on	foreign	trade	was	had	by	the	dramatic	fall	in	the	value	of	the	Ukrain-
ian	currency	which	in	2014–2015	underwent	an	almost	threefold	depreciation.	
The	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	imposed	extremely	severe	restrictions	on	cur-
rency	trade	which	seriously	impeded	the	conducting	of	financial	operations	
with	foreign	entities.	The	banking	sector	crisis	caused	mass	bankruptcies	start-
ing	from	2014	resulting	in	a	reduction	of	the	number	of	banks	from	180	in	Janu-
ary	2014	to	82	in	May	2018	and	almost	prevented	companies’	access	to	loans;	this	
has	also	had	a	strong	impact4.
Table 1. Comparison of dynamics of trade in goods
Export dynamics y/y Import dynamics y/y
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total -8% -15% -29% -5% 19% -9% -29% -31% 5% 26%
Post-Soviet 
countries
-13% -33% -48% -23% 15% -19% -38% -39% -18% 34%
EU -2% 1% -23% 4% 29% 3% -22% -27% 12% 21%
Rest of the 
world
-7% -10% -21% -3% 12% -8% -27% -27% 16% 28%
All	these	factors	very	negatively	affected	Ukrainian	exporters	and	importers	
alike.	As	a	result,	in	2013–2016	Ukrainian	exports	in	aggregate	were	reduced	
by	42%	from	US$62.3	billion	to	US$36.4	billion,	and	imports	contracted	by	48%	
from	US$75.8	billion	to	US$39.2	billion.	2017	was	the	first	year	when	a	signifi-
cant	increase	in	trade	was	seen.	However,	as	compared	to	2013,	the	volume	
of	exports	was	still	lower	31%	lower	and	that	of	imports	35%	lower.
3	 A.	Wilk,	T.A.	Olszański,	W.	Górecki,	The Minsk agreement – one year of shadow boxing,	„OSW	
Analyses”,	10	February	2016,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-02-10/
minsk-agreement-one-year-shadow-boxing
4	 For	more	information	on	the	crisis	see	R.	Sadowski,	The aftermath of the crisis. An overhaul 
of Ukraine’s banking sector,	„OSW	Studies”,	11	August	2017,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-studies/2017-08-11/aftermath-crisis-overhaul-ukraines-banking-sector
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Table 2. Changes of the key sectors of Ukrainian exports (in US$ billions)
food and 
agricultural sector
Metallurgy 
(ores+steelworks) Machine industry
2013 2017 2013 2017 2013 2017
Value 16.9 17.8 21.2 12.7 10.1 4.9
Share in total 
exports
27% 41% 34% 29% 16% 11%
Chart 7. Key exports of the food and agricultural sector in 2017 (US$ billions)5
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Even	though	falls	were	seen	in	almost	all	goods	groups,	their	scale	differed	
to	a	great	extent.	The	falls	were	dramatic	in	the	case	of	many	key	Ukrainian	
exports;	for	example,	in	2017	as	compared	to	2013,	the	export	of	rail	vehicles	was	
reduced	by	91%,	and	in	the	case	of	products	of	the	machine	industry	–	by	54%.	
The	reductions	were	slightly	lower	in	the	case	of	the	sale	of	cast	iron	and	iron	
(-39%)	and	iron	ore	(-28%).	Agriculture	was	the	only	sector	that	was	not	affected	
excessively,	and	in	the	case	of	two	key	exports	volume	grew	(grain	by	2%	and	
oils	by	32%).	In	effect,	food	and	agricultural	products	for	the	first	time	in	the	his-
tory	of	independent	Ukraine	gained	the	dominant	position	in	Ukrainian	exports	
(41%	of	total	exports	in	2017),	coming	ahead	of	metallurgical	products	(29%),	
while	the	role	of	the	machine	industry	was	further	marginalised.	
5	 Goods	whose	export	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2017	are	taken	into	
account.	
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The	boost	in	exports	of	agricultural	products	is	in	general	a	positive	phenom-
enon	that	made	it	much	easier	to	survive	the	most	difficult	period	in	2014–2015,	
ensuring	Ukraine	an	influx	of	foreign	currency	and	partly	compensating	for	
the	losses	in	the	sale	of	products	of	the	metallurgical	and	machine	industries.	
However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	case	of	exports	of	food	and	agricultural	
products,	non-processed	and	low-processed	goods	predominate.	Three	kinds	
of	grain,	two	kinds	of	oil	seed	and	sunflower	oil	account	for	as	much	as	71%	
of	exports	from	this	sector.	Animal	husbandry,	fruit	growing	or	more	advanced	
food	processing	are	developing	slowly	but	still	remain	on	a	low	level	and	are	
aimed	at	satisfying	domestic	demand	and	have	marginal	significance	in	exports.	
Such	a	high	degree	of	dependence	on	several	types	of	crops	also	poses	potential	
threats	to	the	stability	of	exports	because	it	makes	them	sensitive	to	price	fluc-
tuations	on	global	markets	and	weather	conditions.	
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III. THE ruSSIan and oTHEr poST-SovIET MarkETS – 
THE collapSE of TradE 
Ukraine	was	an	integral	part	of	the	Soviet	economy	until	1991.	After	the	collapse	
of	the	USSR,	the	former	Soviet	republics,	above	all	Russia,	remained	Ukraine’s	
key	trade	partner	for	obvious	reasons.	The	new	customs	borders,	the	intro-
duction	of	the	various	currencies	and	the	economic	crisis	in	the	1990s	in	the	
entire	post-Soviet	area	caused	bankruptcies	of	a	significant	section	of	Ukrain-
ian	industrial	plants	and	the	break-up	of	the	numerous	co-operation	bonds,	
although	many	of	them	survived,	especially	in	the	high-tech	sector	such	as	the	
space,	aviation	and	arms	industries.	This	had	a	decisive	effect	on	the	shape	of	the	
goods	structure	of	trade.	In	the	period	between	regaining	independence	and	
2013,	the	significance	of	post-Soviet	countries	in	Ukraine’s	foreign	trade	fell	
regularly,	but	it	still	remained	high	(36%	of	total	trade).	
Chart 8. The share of post-Soviet countries in Ukraine’s trade
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Trade	with	post-Soviet	 countries	 had	 two	distinctive	 features.	 In	 the	 case	
of	imports	this	was	a	very	high	share	of	fuels	(mainly	natural	gas	from	the	Rus-
sian	Federation	and	petrol	from	Belarus)	which	in	2013	accounted	for	as	much	
as	62%	of	Ukrainian	imports	from	post-Soviet	countries.	In	turn,	exports	were	
characterised	by	a	significant	share	of	production	with	a	high	added	value,	
while	in	most	cases	Ukraine	had	very	limited	outlets	for	these	goods.	For	exam-
ple,	the	share	of	machine	and	electric	machine	industries’	products	in	exports	
to	post-Soviet	countries	reached	31%	(which	accounted	for	66%	of	total	Ukrain-
ian	exports	from	this	sector),	that	of	the	chemical	industry	reached	8%	(59%	
of	total	exports)	and	the	paper	industry	was	4%	(91%	of	total	exports).	The	high	
degree	of	the	dependence	of	industrial	production	exports	on	the	Russian	and	
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other	post-Soviet	markets	has	severely	affected	the	Ukrainian	industry	and	
economy	as	a	whole	during	the	Russian	aggression	ongoing	since	2014.	
The	events	that	took	place	in	2014	and	2015	brought	about	a	fundamental	change	
in	these	dependencies.	In	June	2014,	Russia	withheld	gas	supplies	to	Ukraine.	
Unlike	with	the	previous	gas	wars	of	2006	and	2009,	when	the	two	parties	had	
been	able	to	reach	a	compromise	albeit	at	the	price	of	far-reaching	concessions	
from	Ukraine,	this	time	Moscow’s	moves	led	to	a	total	breakdown	of	co-oper-
ation.	In	September	2014,	Ukraine	reached	an	agreement	with	Slovakia	on	the	
launch	of	regular	supplies	via	the	reversed	Vojany–Uzhgorod	gas	pipeline,	which	
made	it	possible	to	rely	solely	on	supplies	of	gas	from	the	EU	transported	via	the	
reversed	gas	pipeline	starting	from	November	2015,	when	Gazprom	withheld	
supplies.	In	effect,	imports	of	fuels	from	post-Soviet	countries	were	reduced	
from	US$17.4	billion	in	2013	to	US$6.1	billion	in	2017,	of	which	US$3.2	billion	
accounted	for	diesel	and	benzene	from	Russia	and	US$2.2	billion	from	Belarus.	
Table 3. Comparison of key Ukrainian imports from post-Soviet countries 
(US$ millions)6
2013 2017 change
fuels and mineral oils 17 441 6 086 -65%
nuclear reactors; boilers; machines and 
mechanical equipment
1393 747 -46%
cast iron and steel 958 464 -52%
machines and electrical equipment 834 175 -79%
fertilisers 758 935 23%
non-rail vehicles 657 321 -51%
plastics 594 386 -35%
Until	 2013,	 the	 Kremlin	 continued	 a	 trade	 blackmail	 policy	 with	 regard	
to	Ukraine.	On	the	one	hand	it	was	tempting	it	with	the	benefits	of	joining	the	
customs	union	as	part	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	while	on	the	other	it	was	
6	 Goods	whose	import	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2013	are	taken	into	
account.	
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gradually	restricting	co-operation	bonds	and	reducing	imports	from	Ukraine,	
employing	non-tariff	measures.	One	example	was	the	withdrawal	of	certificates	
for	Ukrainian	carriages	in	October	20137	which	used	to	be	one	of	Ukraine’s	key	
exports	(their	export	value	stood	at	US$4.1	billion	in	2012).	The	official	reason	
provided	were	repeated	failures,	while	the	real	intention	was	to	protect	the	
domestic	market.	Another	example	of	pressure	on	Ukraine	was	the	week-long	
blockade	of	all	Ukrainian	exports	to	Russia	in	August	2013	under	the	pretext	
of	an	amendment	of	customs	regulations.	
Since	2014,	as	part	of	its	aggression	against	Ukraine,	Russia	has	been	reinforc-
ing	its	military	actions	with	pressure	and	sanctions	in	the	area	of	trade	tar-
geted	against	Ukrainian	exports.	Since	2016,	Moscow	has	imposed	an	embargo	
on	imports	of	food	and	agricultural	products	from	Ukraine.	As	a	result	of	these	
moves,	exports	of	dairy	products	to	Russia	were	nearly	discontinued	(there	
was	a	reduction	from	US$382	million	in	2013	to	US$6,000	in	2017),	and	those	
of	chocolate	and	cocoa	products	were	reduced	by	92%	from	US$337	million	
to	US$27	million.	The	reductions	were	only	a	little	less	dramatic	in	the	case	
of	other	post-Soviet	markets	(-79%	and	-81%,	respectively).	
The	Kremlin	also	launched	measures	aimed	at	disrupting	Ukraine’s	co-opera-
tion	with	other	post-Soviet	countries.	The	aforementioned	problems	with	car-
riage	certification	intensified	in	2014	when	Russia	ceased	to	recognise	analogous	
documents	for	carriages	made	in	Ukraine	issued	by	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan8.	
In	effect,	the	Ukrainian	exports	of	rail	vehicles	to	these	countries	(in	fact	the	
only	buyers	of	these	products	apart	from	Russia)	collapsed,	as	its	value	was	
reduced	from	US$2.3	billion	in	2013	to	US$144	million	in	2017.	Another	exam-
ple	of	Moscow’s	moves	targeted	against	Ukraine	was	the	introduction	of	new	
rules	in	February	2016	that	significantly	restricted	the	possibility	of	the	transit	
of	Ukrainian	goods	through	Russian	territory.	This	extremely	severely	affected	
trade	with	all	Central	Asian	countries,	especially	Ukrainian	exports	to	Kazakh-
stan,	Kyiv’s	main	 trade	partner	 in	 this	 region.	As	a	 result,	 in	2017	as	com-
pared	to	2013	exports	to	the	Kazakh	market	fell	by	82%	from	US$2.1	billion	
7	 Россия отказалась от вагонов украинского производства,	„Зеркало	Недели”,	29	October	
2013,	https://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/rossiya-otkazalas-ot-vagonov-ukrainskogo-proizvod-
stva-131818_.html
8	 Иск против России о запрете импорта вагонов: Украина ожидает решения ВТО в следу - 
ющем году,	Unian,	11	July	2017,	https://economics.unian.net/industry/2023606-isk-protiv-
rossii-o-zaprete-importa-vagonov-ukraina-ojidaet-resheniya-vto-v-sleduyuschem-godu.
html
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to	US$372	million,	and	Astana	moved	down	from	7th	to	33rd	place	in	the	ranking	
of	the	recipients	of	Ukrainian	production.	
Table 4. Comparison of key Ukrainian exports to post-Soviet countries 
(US$ billions)9
2013 2017 change
cast iron and steel 2902 997 -66%
nuclear reactors; boilers; machines and mechanical equipment 2730 854 -69%
locomotives and rolling stock 2297 144 -94%
cast iron and steel products 1891 347 -82%
machines and electrical equipment 1351 318 -76%
inorganic chemicals 998 626 -37%
paper and cardboard 983 294 -70%
fuels and mineral oils 594 182 -69%
salt, sulphur, soils and stones 543 155 -72%
plastics 514 268 -48%
All	Moscow’s	moves	as	described	above	have	been	aimed	at	escalating	the	
economic	crisis	to	the	maximum	extent	and	causing	the	downfall	of	the	gov-
ernment	in	Kyiv.	The	Kremlin	wanted	to	provoke	public	dissatisfaction	and	
mass	protests	especially	in	the	industrialised	eastern	regions	of	Ukraine.	This	
did	not	happen	not	only	because	of	the	patriotic	spurt	and	consolidation	of	the	
public	in	the	face	of	the	Russian	threat,	but	also	because	the	DCFTA	began	
to	bring	effects.
9	 Goods	whose	export	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2013	are	taken	into	
account.	
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Iv. THE Eu, THE MoST IMporTanT buT dIffIculT 
parTnEr
Before	2014,	the	European	Union	was	an	important	but	not	a	key	trade	partner	
for	Ukraine.	In	2013,	25%	of	Ukrainian	exports	went	to	EU	member	states,	which	
was	significantly	less	than	in	the	case	of	the	post-Soviet	countries	(35%)	and	
other	countries	(39%).	In	the	preceding	years,	the	EU’s	share	remained	at	a	level	
slightly	below	30%.	At	the	same	time,	both	Brussels	and	Kyiv	were	interested	
in	intensifying	economic	co-operation.	Ukraine	was	treated	as	a	promising	out-
let.	In	turn,	the	Ukrainian	business	circles	counted	on	the	benefits	which	the	
removal	of	most	customs	barriers	on	the	EU	market	would	bring.	For	this	pur-
pose	negotiations	of	the	Association	Agreement	(AA)	were	launched	in	2008.	
The	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	agreement	envisaging	
not	only	a	reduction	in	customs	duties	but	also	a	far-reaching	harmonisation	
of	Ukrainian	norms	and	standards	with	those	of	the	EU	was	to	be	part	of	the	
AA.	The	negotiations	ended	in	December	2011,	and	the	document	was	initialled	
in	 July	 2012.	This	provoked	fierce	 objection	 from	Russia	which	 feared	 (not	
unreasonably)	that	Ukraine’s	adoption	of	EU	norms	and	standards	would	rule	
out	Kyiv’s	engagement	in	any	integration	projects	under	the	aegis	of	Moscow	
in	the	post-Soviet	area	in	the	future,	which	had	been	the	Kremlin’s	strategic	goal	
for	years.	President	Viktor	Yanukovych	refused	to	sign	the	Association	Agree-
ment	under	Russian	pressure	in	November	2013.	This	was	the	immediate	cause	
of	the	outbreak	of	the	public	protests	which	led	to	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	and	
the	toppling	of	Yanukovych	in	February	2014,	which	in	turn	provoked	the	Rus-
sian	aggression	against	Ukraine.	
The	crisis	triggered	by	the	revolution	and	the	Russian	moves	in	eastern	Ukraine	
caused	the	new	government	in	Kyiv	to	sign	the	Association	Agreement	as	late	
as	June	2014.	In	April	2014,	the	European	Commission	introduced	Autonomous	
Trade	Measures	(ATM)	with	regard	to	Ukraine,	while	Ukraine	retained	its	cus-
toms	tariffs	on	EU	products.	This	was	intended	as	a	form	of	support	for	Kyiv	
during	the	escalating	economic	crisis.	At	the	same	time,	trilateral	negotiations	
in	the	EU-Ukraine-Russia	format	were	being	conducted	during	which	Moscow	
insisted	on	a	thorough	revision	of	the	DCFTA	(including	the	change	of	tariffs	for	
2,800	groups	of	goods)	and	postponing	the	entry	into	force	of	the	agreement.	
Given	the	de	facto	war	with	Russia	and	pressure	from	some	EU	member	states,	
it	was	decided	to	postpone	the	entry	into	force	of	the	DCFTA	and	to	prolong	the	
operation	of	the	ATMs	through	2015.	The	agreement	became	binding	on	a	tem-
porary	basis	from	1	January	2016	and	to	the	full	extent	(after	all	EU	member	
states	closed	ratification	procedures)	only	from	1	September	2017.	According	
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to	the	document,	the	customs	tariffs	on	most	goods	were	reduced	to	zero,	and	
in	the	case	of	all	others,	transition	periods	were	introduced	for	a	maximum	of	up	
to	seven	years.	Tariff	Rate	Quotas	(TRQ)	were	introduced	for	36	groups	of	goods.	
Once	the	quotas	have	been	used	fully,	Ukraine	has	to	pay	customs	duty	at	the	
full	rate.	The	TRQ	apply	with	regard	to	goods	which	are	recognised	as	especially	
sensitive	in	the	EU.	It	is	not	incidental	that	part	of	them	concerns	products	in	the	
areas	where	Ukraine	is	competitive	(for	example,	wheat	and	poultry).	
The	ATMs	and	later	the	DCFTA	made	it	possible	to	essentially	alleviate	the	con-
sequences	of	the	collapse	of	Ukraine’s	trade.	Even	though	in	2014	and	2015	the	
reductions	in	trade	with	the	EU	were	significant,	they	were	still	much	lower	
than	in	trade	with	post-Soviet	countries	or	third	countries.	Ukrainian	exports	
to	the	EU	fell	only	in	2015	(-23%),	and	imports	in	2014–2015	(by	22%	and	27%,	
respectively).	Starting	from	2016,	the	Ukrainian	exports	started	growing,	at	the	
beginning	at	a	small	rate	(5%)	to	grow	by	29%	the	next	year	to	US$17.5	billion,	
thus	reaching	a	level	higher	than	that	in	2013	(US$16.8	billion).	It	is	also	worth	
noting	that	exports	to	the	EU	in	2017	were	growing	at	a	much	faster	rate	than	
to	post-Soviet	countries	(15%)	and	the	remaining	countries	(12%)	in	the	same	
period,	which	is	one	more	proof	of	the	DCFTA’s	effectiveness.	
When	one	compares	the	data	for	2013	and	2017,	it	appears	that	out	of	the	eight	
key	groups	of	goods	exported	by	Ukraine	to	the	EU	(worth	over	US$500	mil-
lion)	three	generated	growth	(and	in	the	case	of	one	of	them,	the	growth	was	
very	significant	–	the	value	of	the	sales	of	fats	and	oils	tripled),	and	only	one	saw	
a	significant	drop.	The	drop	in	sales	of	metallurgical	products	was	to	a	great	
extent	an	effect	of	the	problems	this	sector	was	experiencing	in	Ukraine	(the	
disruption	of	numerous	production	chains	as	a	result	of	the	military	operation).	
Some	groups	of	goods	which	had	previously	been	of	minor	significance	gener-
ated	impressive	growth;	for	example,	sales	of	meat	products	grew	from	US$1	
million	to	US$136	million,	dairy	products	from	US$42	million	to	US$121	million,	
and	furniture	from	US$145	million	to	US$418	million.	
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Table 5. Comparison of key Ukrainian exports to the EU (US$ millions)10
2013 2017 change
cast iron and steel 4061 3190 -21%
metal ores 1759 1545 -12%
grain 1708 1677 -2%
machines and electrical equipment 1501 2043 36%
oleaginous seeds and fruit 1250 1095 -12%
fuels and mineral oils 924 524 -43%
wood and wooden products 611 834 36%
fats and oils 499 1 472 195%
In	the	case	of	imports	from	the	EU	the	results	were	much	poorer.	This	was	above	
all	an	effect	of	the	depreciation	of	the	Ukrainian	currency	and,	as	a	consequence,	
the	reduction	of	the	Ukrainian	public’s	purchasing	power.	Even	though	in	2016	
and	2017	imports	from	the	EU	grew	by	respectively	12%	and	21%,	they	were	still	
much	lower	than	in	2013	(US$20.8	billion	as	compared	to	US$27	billion	in	2017),	
and	the	value	of	imports	in	all	but	one	key	group	of	goods	dropped.	
Table 6. Comparison of key Ukrainian imports from the EU (in US$ millions)11
2013 2017 change
nuclear reactors; boilers; machines and mechanical equipment 3413 2962 -13%
fuels and mineral oils 3018 3039 1%
non-rail vehicles 2757 2171 -21%
pharmaceutical products 2307 1287 -44%
machines and electrical equipment 1869 1573 -16%
plastics 1787 1275 -29%
paper and cardboard 1139 558 -51%
10	 Goods	whose	export	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2013	are	taken	into	
account.	
11	 Goods	whose	import	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2013	are	taken	into	
account.	
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The	first	results	after	the	DCFTA	came	into	force	provoked	disappointment	
in	Kyiv,	where	 it	had	been	expected	 that	exports	 to	 the	EU	would	 increase	
at	a	much	higher	rate	which	would	compensate	for	the	loss	of	the	Russian	and	
other	post-Soviet	markets.	However,	it	seems	that	these	expectations	were	quite	
unrealistic,	especially	in	the	case	of	the	Ukrainian	industrial	production.	It	was	
possible	to	directly	and	quickly	replace	the	Russian	market	only	in	some	cases	
and	to	a	limited	extent	(for	example,	dairy	products).	In	the	case	of	some	major	
(until	recently)	Ukrainian	exports	to	the	post-Soviet	market,	such	as	railway	
carriages,	it	seems	impossible	to	find	a	buyer	in	the	EU	member	states	in	the	
foreseeable	future.	
The	difficulties	of	Ukrainian	exporters	selling	goods	to	the	EU	result	from	sev-
eral	factors.	One	of	the	most	important	factors	is	that	the	EU	market	is	very	com-
petitive	and	it	is	difficult	to	enter	it	with	new	products	without	spending	much	
on	marketing	(something	Ukrainian	companies	usually	do	not	have	sufficient	
funds	for,	nor	do	they	know	how	to	do	this).	One	of	Ukraine’s	advantages	are	
low	labour	costs.	However,	in	many	cases	this	advantage	is	lost	due	to	low	effi-
ciency,	poor	legal	protection,	poor	infrastructure,	and	expenses	caused	by	the	
omnipresent	corruption.	Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	some	goods,	transition	
periods	still	apply	when	the	customs	rates	are	not	fully	reduced	(which	will	
happen	within	seven	years	of	the	entry	into	force	of	the	document).	
Another	problem	is	the	issue	of	norms	and	standards	linked	to	technical	bar-
riers	to	trade	(TBT)	and	sanitary	and	phytosanitary	standards	(SPS).	The	Asso-
ciation	Agreement	and	the	DCFTA	mean	that	Ukraine	has	to	adopt	hundreds	
of	directives,	regulations	and	other	legal	acts	harmonising	Ukrainian	law	with	
that	of	the	EU.	While	in	the	case	of	the	TBTs,	Ukraine	has	fulfilled	most	of	its	
obligations,	in	the	case	of	the	SPS	and	the	agricultural	sector	linked	to	it	the	
implementation	has	hardly	begun.	As	a	total,	as	of	June	2018,	out	of	the	1,941	
activities	envisaged	in	the	Association	Agreement,	Ukraine	had	implemented	
112,	and	in	the	case	of	386	it	is	behind	the	schedule12.	
Instead	of	focusing	on	the	implementation	of	the	norms	and	standards,	the	
Ukrainian	government	has	been	actively	lobbying	to	raise	the	customs	quo-
tas.	Due	to	strong	resistance	from	some	member	states	fearing	the	competi-
tion	of	Ukrainian	products,	the	lobbying	was	successful	only	to	a	small	degree.	
In	2016,	 the	European	Commission	 suggested	 introducing	 the	 second	ATM	
12	 Навігатор	Угоди,	„Європейська	Правда”,	accessed	on	10	June	2018,	http://navigator.euro-
integration.com.ua/tasks
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programme	in	which	the	TRQs	for	selected	products	were	temporarily	increased	
(mainly	grains)	and	customs	duty	was	lifted	in	the	case	of	23	tariff	lines	(mainly	
products	of	 the	textile	 industry).	The	European	Commission’s	proposal	was	
accepted	by	the	European	Parliament	to	a	limited	extent	and	began	to	be	bind-
ing	from	October	2017.	However,	according	to	preliminary	estimates,	the	impact	
of	ATM	II	on	the	increase	of	Ukrainian	exports	in	2018	will	be	marginal	(0.6%)13.
13	 V.	Movchan,	R.	Giucci,	New autonomous trade measures by the EU: Impact on Ukrainian export,	
German	 Advisory	 Group	 Ukraine,	 September/October	 2017,	 http://www.beratergruppe-
ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PB_09_2017_en.pdf
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v. THE rEST of THE world – THE unSuccESSful SEarcH 
for nEw ouTlETS 
Countries	outside	the	EU	and	the	post-Soviet	area,	above	all	from	North	Africa	
and	the	Middle	East	(Turkey,	Egypt,	Iran,	Saudi	Arabia)	and	Asia	(China	and	
India)	are	among	the	key	trade	partners	of	Ukraine,	especially	as	recipients	
of	exports	with	which	(with	the	exception	of	China)	Kyiv	regularly	generated	
very	high	trade	surpluses.	However,	the	crisis	in	2014–2015	adversely	affected	
economic	relations	with	these	countries	as	well	–	exports	fell	from	US$24.5	
billion	in	2013	to	US$18.9	billion	in	2017	(-23%),	and	imports	fell	from	US$22	bil-
lion	to	US$17.3	billion	(-21%).	While	in	the	case	of	the	collapse	of	trade	with	Rus-
sia	and	other	CIS	countries,	political	factors	were	decisive,	it	appears	that	the	
reduction	of	trade	with	third	countries	has	been	caused	by	Ukraine’s	economic	
problems,	in	particular,	restrictions	on	operations	on	the	currency	market	and	
the	difficulties	companies	experience	with	access	to	loans.	
Table 7. Ukraine’s key partners from third countries14
  Exports (uS$ billions) Imports (uS$ billions)
  2013 2017 change 2013 2017 change
Turkey 3.8 2.5 -33% 1.8 1.3 -28%
India 2.0 2.2 13% 0.8 0.6 -33%
china 2.7 2.0 -24% 7.4 5.6 -24%
Egypt 2.7 1.8 -33% 0.1 0.1 -43%
After	2014,	since	Ukraine	lost	a	significant	share	of	the	post-Soviet	markets,	the	
main	challenge	for	it	was	to	find	an	alternative,	especially	for	products	of	the	
food	and	agricultural	and	the	 industrial	sectors.	 In	addition	to	 the	attempt	
to	enter	the	EU	market	as	described	above,	another	solution	was	to	develop	
trade	with	its	remaining	trade	partners.	Analysing	the	data	one	may	notice	
that	Kyiv	has	partly	succeeded	in	this.	In	2017,	as	compared	to	2013,	sales	of	key	
groups	of	goods	 from	the	 food	and	agricultural	 sector	did	not	undergo	any	
major	changes	or	grew	(grains,	fats	and	oils).	Furthermore,	Ukraine	managed	
14	 Countries	where	total	trade	exceeded	one	billion	US	dollars	in	2017	are	taken	into	account.
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to	significantly	boost	exports	of	goods	that	were	previously	of	marginal	sig-
nificance	(tobacco	–	a	115%	increase,	meat	and	meat	products	–	a	146%	increase,	
groats	–	a	141%	increase).	However,	in	the	case	of	industrial	products,	the	pre-
vious	export	volumes	not	only	failed	to	remain	on	their	previous	levels	–	they	
were	even	reduced	significantly	 (the	machine	 industry	 -37%,	 the	chemical	
industry	-86%).
Table 8. Comparison of key Ukrainian exports to third countries 
(US$ millions)15
2013 2017 change
cast iron and steel 7357 4479 -39%
grains 4601 4799 4%
fats and oils 2783 3046 9%
metal ores 2082 1141 -45%
fuels and mineral oils 1348 85 -94%
fertilisers 989 81 -92%
nuclear reactors; boilers; machines 
and mechanical equipment
695 440 -37%
oleaginous seeds and fruit 692 901 30%
inorganic chemicals 543 77 -86%
15	 Goods	whose	export	value	reached	at	least	half	a	billion	US	dollars	in	2013	are	taken	into	
account.	
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vI. TradE In SErvIcES
The	value	of	the	trade	in	services	is	much	lower	than	that	of	the	trade	in	goods.	
In	2017,	exports	and	imports	of	services	were	worth	a	total	of	US$15.4	billion,	
which	was	17%	of	the	total	value	of	exports	and	imports	of	goods	(US$92.9	bil-
lion).	This	proportion	was	similar	in	the	preceding	years.	
The	trade	in	services	has	suffered	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	to	a	slightly	smaller	
extent	than	the	trade	in	goods	–	in	2017	as	compared	to	2013	exports	of	services	
were	27%	smaller,	and	imports	were	reduced	by	29%.	However,	as	compared	
to	the	trade	in	goods,	the	downward	trend	turned	out	to	be	much	stronger,	so	the	
improvement	of	the	economic	situation	in	2016	and	in	particular	in	2017	affected	
the	trade	in	services	to	a	limited	extent.	Imports	in	2017	were	reduced	by	7%	
year	on	year,	and	exports	grew	only	6%	year	on	year	(for	comparison,	imports	
of	goods	in	the	same	period	increased	by	26%,	and	exports	by	19%).
Table 9. Comparison of dynamics of trade in services 
dynamics of exports y/y dynamics of imports y/y
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 1% -19% -15% 1% 6% 13% -15% -13% -4% -7%
post-Soviet 
countries 0% -31% -12% 5% 0% 18% -18% -30% -20% -5%
Eu 12% -5% -27% 3% 11% 16% -25% -13% -12% 3%
rest of the world -7% -17% -7% -4% 8% 4% 10% -4% 15% -19%
Unlike	with	the	trade	in	goods,	the	share	of	EU	and	post-Soviet	countries	and	
the	rest	of	the	world	in	the	Ukrainian	trade	in	services	did	not	change	much.	
In	2017,	as	four	years	before,	the	EU	remained	Ukraine’s	main	partner,	and	the	
share	of	post-Soviet	countries	was	reduced	a	little	but	still	remained	high,	above	
all	in	exports.	
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Chart 9. Exports and imports of services in 2013–2017 (US$ billions)
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Source:	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine
Chart 10. Comparison of the geographical structure of trade in services 
in 2013 and 2017
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Another	important	feature	of	the	Ukrainian	trade	in	services	is	the	stable	and	
high	trade	surplus.	This	concerns	partners	from	all	geographical	areas,	how-
ever,	an	especially	strong	increase	in	the	surplus	can	be	observed	in	trade	with	
the	EU	as	it	grew	from	a	level	of	US$178	million	in	2015	to	US$827	million	in	2017,	
which	can	also	be	treated	as	a	positive	effect	of	the	DCFTA.
Table 10. Balance of trade in services (US$ millions)
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 6710 5148 4214 4541 5500
Post-Soviet countries 4348 2830 2705 3055 3098
EU -16 843 178 583 827
Rest of the world 2399 1716 1584 1261 1310
1. geographical characteristics of the trade in services
As	compared	to	the	trade	in	goods,	exports	of	services	from	Ukraine	are	much	
less	diversified	 in	geographical	 terms.	Nearly	50%	of	services	are	exported	
to	three	countries:	the	Russian	Federation,	the	USA	and	Switzerland.	Other	
major	partners	are:	the	United	Kingdom,	Germany	and	Poland.	Only	in	the	case	
of	Poland	and	the	USA	were	exports	of	services	higher	in	2017	as	compared	to	the	
last	year	before	the	crisis.	
Table 11. Exports of services – key countries (US$ millions)
  2013 2017 change
Total 14 233 10 447 -27%
Russia 5258 3404 -35%
USA 724 814 12%
Switzerland 1018 742 -27%
United Kingdom 753 573 -24%
Germany 681 523 -23%
Poland 218 275 26%
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Unlike	 with	 exports,	 quite	 serious	 changes	 have	 taken	 place	 since	 2013	
in	imports	of	services,	above	all	a	major	fall	in	the	role	played	by	Russia	(which	
in	2013	was	Ukraine’s	main	partner	in	this	area).	
Table 12. Imports of services – key countries (US$ millions)
  2013 2017 change
Total 7523 5359 -29%
USA 362 570 58%
United Kingdom 1060 499 -53%
Russia 1233 424 -66%
Germany 622 370 -41%
Turkey 213 357 68%
Cyprus 1018 225 -78%
2. The most important kinds of exported services
Transport	accounts	for	more	than	half	of	Ukraine’s	exports	of	services	(US$5.7	
billion	in	2017),	including	US$3	billion	pipeline	transport	(this	concerns	mainly	
the	transit	of	Russian	natural	gas	via	Ukrainian	territory).	Over	the	past	ten	
years,	depending	on	the	year,	transit	fees	would	differ	significantly,	from	US$2.1	
billion	in	2009	to	US$3.8	billion	in	2011,	still	invariably	remaining	the	largest	
source	of	income	in	the	area	of	exports	of	services.	The	differences	were	caused	
above	all	by	changes	in	demand	for	Russian	gas	on	the	EU	market.	Moscow	has	
for	years	been	regularly	making	efforts	to	reduce	the	significance	of	Ukraine	
as	a	transit	country.	The	possible	construction	of	the	Nord	Stream	2	gas	pipe-
lines	and	the	expiry	of	the	transit	agreement	between	Russia	and	Ukraine	at	the	
end	of	2019	for	Kyiv	will	mean	the	loss	of	a	major	share	of	income	in	this	area	
and	will	escalate	problems	with	the	payment	balance	(for	more	details	see	the	
text	below).
While	the	Russian-Ukrainian	conflict	has	had	a	small	impact	on	income	from	
pipeline	transport,	two	other	major	items	in	Ukraine’s	exports	of	services,	rail-
way	and	maritime	transport,	have	been	affected	very	severely	by	it.	The	trade	
war	and	the	restrictions	and	barriers	introduced	by	Russia	in	the	area	of	the	
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transport	of	goods	caused	tangible	losses.	Income	generated	by	maritime	trans-
port	services	in	2017	was	US$608	million	(a	41%	fall	in	comparison	to	2013),	and	
railway	transport	was	US$572	million	(63%	fall).	In	both	cases	the	downward	
trend	has	continued	over	the	past	four	years	and,	given	the	fact	that	there	are	
no	chances	of	improving	relations	with	Russia	in	the	coming	years,	it	is	unlikely	
that	this	trend	will	be	reversed.	
The	only	services	in	Ukrainian	exports	to	have	generated	rapid	growth	are	IT	
services.	A	rapid	development	in	this	area	began	already	before	the	crisis	–	the	
value	of	exports	of	services	in	the	IT	sector	grew	from	US$255	million	to	US$931	
million	between	2010	and	2013.	The	economic	collapse	did	not	affect	the	IT	sector	
later	on,	and	exports	in	2013–2017	grew	by	36%,	reaching	a	value	of	US$1.3	bil-
lion.	The	key	recipients	are:	the	USA,	Switzerland,	the	United	Kingdom,	Russia	
and	Israel.	However,	it	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	dynamics	of	growth	of	IT	
service	exports	is	gradually	reducing	–	while	in	2013	growth	reached	44%	year	
on	year,	in	2017	this	rate	was	only	11%.	This	is	most	likely	a	result	of	the	limita-
tion	of	the	development	rate	of	the	IT	sector	in	Ukraine	due	to	the	unfavourable	
business	climate	affecting	this	sector	to	an	increasing	extent16.	
16	 IT Украины. Помогать нельзя мешать,	 FINANCE.UA,	 31	 January	 2018,	 https://news.
finance.ua/ru/news/-/419649/it-ukrainy-pomogat-nelzya-meshat
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vII. cHallEngES lInkEd To THE balancE of TradE
The	Ukrainian	foreign	trade	in	goods	since	2005	has	been	characterised	by	an	
increasingly	negative	trade	balance.	This	problem	concerned	both	post-Soviet	
countries	(mainly	due	to	the	imports	of	fuels)	and	the	EU.	The	positive	trade	
balance	with	other	countries	was	unable	to	compensate	for	this	growing	dis-
proportion	and	in	2008	the	negative	trade	balance	reached	a	record-high	value	
of	US$18.6	billion	(the	equivalent	of	10.3%	of	the	value	of	the	then	GDP).	One	
of	the	side	effects	of	the	economic	crisis	in	2009	was	an	improvement	of	the	bal-
ance	(which	still	remained	negative)	and	in	2013	the	deficit	in	the	trade	in	goods	
reached	US$13.7	billion.	As	mentioned	above,	Ukraine	has	regularly	generated	
a	positive	balance	in	trade	in	services.	This	allowed	the	trade	deficit	to	be	limited	
as	a	whole	to	a	certain	degree	but	not	to	eliminate	it	completely.	
Chart 11. Ukraine’s trade balance (US$ millions)
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Source:	State	Statistics	Committee	of	Ukraine	
The	negative	trade	balance	caused	a	drain	of	the	country’s	currency	reserves	and	
was	one	of	the	causes	of	the	economic	crisis	in	2014–2015	and	the	depreciation	
of	the	Ukrainian	currency.	The	collapse	of	trade	affected	imports	to	a	greater	
extent	than	exports,	which	made	it	possible	to	counterpoise	the	balance	of	trade	
in	goods.	Owing	 to	 this,	Ukraine	 in	2015	generated	a	 trade	 surplus	 for	 the	
first	time	in	eleven	years.	The	continuing	positive	balance	of	trade	in	services	
in	2014–2016	ensured	Kyiv	a	positive	trade	balance	of	almost	US$5	billion,	which	
seriously	(apart	from	co-operation	with	the	IMF)	contributed	to	the	stabilisa-
tion	of	the	country’s	balance	of	payments	and	increasing	currency	reserves.	
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The	improvement	of	 the	economic	situation	 in	Ukraine	and	the	more	rapid	
growth	of	imports	than	exports	caused	the	phenomenon	existing	before	the	
crisis	to	return	in	2017.	As	imports	grew,	the	negative	balance	of	trade	in	goods	
was	higher	than	the	surpluses	generated	by	the	trade	in	services	and,	as	a	result,	
Ukraine	closed	the	year	with	a	trade	deficit	of	US$832	million.	This	trend	may	
intensify,	especially	if	a	significant	share	of	the	incomes	generated	by	Russian	
gas	transit	is	lost.	This	will	mean	a	serious	problem	to	the	country’s	balance	
of	payments,	especially	in	a	situation	of	de	facto	frozen	co-operation	with	the	
IMF	and	the	very	low	level	of	foreign	direct	investments	which	might	have	
counterbalanced	the	increasing	deficit.	
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ConClusion and possible developmenTs
Very	 serious	 changes	 took	 place	 in	 Ukraine’s	 foreign	 trade	 in	 2013–2017	
as	regards	both	geographical	and	goods	structures.	This	was	an	effect	of	the	
Russian	aggression	on	Ukraine	on	the	one	hand	and	on	the	other	of	the	ben-
eficial	influence	of	the	DFCTA,	owing	to	which	the	European	Union	became	
Ukraine’s	largest	economic	partner,	and	the	role	of	post-Soviet	countries	was	
dramatically	reduced.	Even	though	in	2017	Ukraine’s	trade	with	Russia	and	
the	post-Soviet	countries	grew,	this	growth	was	much	lower	than	in	the	case	
of	the	EU	or	other	countries.	It	seems	that	this	trend	will	only	strengthen	in	the	
coming	years.	
As	Kyiv	will	be	implementing	the	provisions	of	the	Association	Agreement,	
in	particular	the	part	concerning	norms	and	standards,	Ukrainian	firms	will	
find	it	increasingly	easier	to	gain	access	to	the	EU	market.	The	significance	of	the	
rest	of	the	world	as	a	key	outlet	for	Ukrainian	food	and	agricultural	products	
and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	of	industrial	products	will	remain	very	high.	In	turn,	
the	post-Soviet	area	has	most	likely	lost	its	significance	for	good.	Ukraine	has	
no	chance	of	regaining	its	lost	positions	on	the	Russian	market	without	a	radical	
improvement	of	political	relations	between	Kyiv	and	Moscow,	which	is	rather	
unrealistic	in	the	coming	years.	Even	if	this	happens,	it	is	doubtful	that	Russia	
will	want	to	rebuild	the	bonds	of	co-operation	it	was	trying	to	weaken	already	
before	2014.	
It	 seems	 that	 the	 changes	which	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 goods	 structure	
of	 Ukrainian	 trade	 are	 irreversible.	 Even	 though	 the	 trend	 suggesting	 an	
increasing	significance	of	agriculture	and	a	decreasing	role	of	metallurgy	and	
the	machine	sector	could	already	be	observed	before	2013,	it	accelerated	rapidly	
in	2013–2017.	
It	can	be	assumed	with	a	high	degree	of	certainty	that	the	significance	of	exports	
of	 food	 and	 agricultural	 products	will	 continue	 to	 grow.	This	 is	 a	 positive	
phenomenon	in	 itself	and,	given	Ukraine’s	climate	and	high	quality	of	soil,	
it	is	in	a	way	natural.	It	is	worth	noting	that	low	processed	or	unprocessed	prod-
ucts	(grains,	oleaginous	seeds	and	vegetable	oils)	accounted	for	as	much	as	three	
quarters	of	Ukrainian	exports	of	agricultural	products.	This	means	a	continu-
ation	of	the	approach	which	could	be	observed	in	the	metallurgical	industry:	
the	desire	to	earn	as	much	as	possible	with	a	minimal	level	of	investments	and	
high	sensitivity	to	economic	fluctuations	on	the	global	markets.	Nevertheless,	
nothing	suggests	that	this	approach	could	change.	On	the	contrary,	61	million	
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tonnes	of	grain	was	harvested	in	Ukraine	in	2017,	of	which	42	million	tonnes	
were	exported	and,	according	to	the	president	of	the	Ukrainian	Grain	Associa-
tion,	the	total	grain	crops	by	2020	may	reach	as	much	as	100	million	tonnes17.	
Even	if	such	rapid	growth	in	such	a	short	time	is	recognised	as	being	unreal-
istic,	nobody	doubts	that	the	surface	and	the	intensity	of	crop	cultivation	will	
continue	to	increase.	It	is	possible	to	indicate	several	reasons	why	Ukrainian	
agriculture	is	developing	extensively	to	a	large	degree.	One	of	the	main	reasons	
is	the	moratorium	on	the	sale	of	agricultural	land	which	means	that	tenant	
farmers	do	not	care	about	soil	quality,	do	not	avoid	overexploitation,	and	are	
not	interested	in	major	investments.	This	approach	is	changing	slowly,	and	sales	
of	processed	food	is	beginning	to	grow	slowly	in	Ukraine,	but	this	is	still	a	small	
share	(around	3%)	of	exports.
Unlike	with	agriculture,	the	future	of	the	Ukrainian	machine	industry	looks	
very	 pessimistic.	The	 loss	 of	 a	major	 share	 of	 the	 post-Soviet	market	 very	
severely	affected	the	Ukrainian	hi-tech	industry.	It	seems	impossible	that	such	
key	companies	as	Antonov,	Motor	Sich	(the	aviation	industry)	or	Yuzhmash	(the	
space	industry)	could	function	in	their	previous	forms.	Thus	Ukraine	will	not	
manage	to	regain	its	previous	level	of	exports	with	a	high	added	value.	
It	may	be	expected	that	in	the	case	of	the	exports	of	services,	the	income	gener-
ated	by	the	IT	sector	will	continue	to	grow,	albeit	at	a	slower	rate.	Maintaining	
the	income	from	transport	services	at	the	existing	level	will	be	a	challenge	for	
Ukraine.	It	seems	that,	without	improving	relations	with	Moscow,	Kyiv	will	
not	manage	to	return	to	the	level	of	income	it	had	in	the	area	of	maritime	and	
railway	transport	in	2013.	However,	the	greatest	threat	will	be	linked	to	the	
construction	of	the	Nord	Stream	2	gas	pipeline	and	the	loss	of	profits	generated	
by	Russian	gas	transit.	
The	future	of	trade	will	depend	above	all	on	the	condition	of	the	Ukrainian	
economy.	However,	macroeconomic	and	trade	data	for	2017	prove	that	the	cri-
sis	is	over.	Nevertheless,	economic	growth	is	still	disappointing	and	Ukraine	
is	still	far	from	achieving	the	level	it	had	in	2013.	The	Ukrainian	government	
after	2014	has	not	 created	 conditions	 for	 the	 influx	of	 foreign	capital,	 and	
the	business	climate	in	Ukraine	has	not	improved	significantly.	Meanwhile,	
without	a	thorough	modernisation	of	industry,	that	would	entail	the	influx	
17	 Украина к 2020 году будет выращивать около 100 млн. тонн зерна – УЗА, АПКИНФОРМ,	
17	December	2017,	https://www.apk-inform.com/ru/news/1091014#.W-rmNeKNyHu
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of	foreign	investments,	Kyiv	will	not	manage	to	increase	exports	of	high	pro-
cessed	products	to	EU	countries,	and	will	find	it	difficult	to	do	so	to	third	mar-
kets.	This	will	mean	that	the	significance	of	the	machine	industry	will	continue	
to	decline	in	Ukraine	and	the	reliance	on	the	sale	of	agricultural	and	metal-
lurgical	products	will	grow.	
SŁAWOMIR MATUSZAK
